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1403 
HOW NECESSARY IS THE RIGHT OF 
ASSEMBLY? 
ROBERT K. VISCHER  
As a political culture seemingly hard-wired for the full-throated 
championing of individual rights, we are not quite sure what to do with 
liberty claims by groups. Whether we are talking about corporate speech 
rights,
1
 the treatment of religious student groups at public universities,
2
 the 
limits of the ministerial exception,
3
 the Boy Scouts‘ right to discriminate,4 
or churches‘ access to public schools,5 we have seen a recent spate of 
conflicts involving groups that have spawned both political battles and 
landmark Supreme Court rulings. As such, our uneasiness with the right of 
association as a constitutional matter may have something to do with our 
uneasiness with the freedom of association as a political matter. We do not 
quite know what to do with groups. Judging from the public reaction to the 
 
 
  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School 
of Law (Minnesota).  
 1. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See also, e.g., Mimi 
Marziani, Growing backlash against ‗Citizens United,‘ NAT‘L LAW J., Jan. 23, 2012 (―The logic of 
FEC v. Citizens United quickly led to the creation of Super PACs, mutant political groups that can 
collect and spend unlimited amounts on electioneering, limited only by impotent rules that supposedly 
prevent them from directly strategizing with candidates . . . .‖). 
 2. Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding public university‘s 
right to require that all student groups be open to all students). See also, e.g., Pierce Greenberg, 
Vanderbilt administrators defend nondiscrimination policy to packed town hall, NASHVILLE CITY 
PAPER, Jan. 31, 2012, http://nashvillecitypaper.com/content/city-news/vanderbilt-administrators-
defend-nondiscrimination-policy-packed-town-hall (reporting on controversy surrounding Vanderbilt 
University‘s requirement that leadership of Christian student groups be open to non-Christians). 
 3. Hosanna-Tabor Evang. Luth. Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (affirming that 
First Amendment guarantees churches the right to select their own ministers without clarifying the 
scope of ―ministers‖). See also, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Michael Luo, Obama Seeks Bigger Role for 
Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A1 (reporting on Sen. Obama‘s proposal to forbid 
employment discrimination by recipients of federal funding); Dana Milbank, Charity Cites Bush Help 
in Fight Against Hiring Gays; Salvation Army Wants Exemption From Laws, WASH. POST., July 10, 
2001, at A1. 
 4. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). See also, e.g., Ian Urbina, Boy Scouts Lose 
Philadelphia Lease in Gay-Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A26 (reporting on city‘s 
eviction of Scout troop over policy discriminating against gays); John Iwasaki, Atheist expects Boy 
Scouts to change, but not soon, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 29, 2002, at B1 (plus media 
controversies re gays and atheists). 
 5. Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (upholding Christian group‘s 
right to use public school facilities on same terms as other community groups). See also, e.g., Kate 
Taylor, Mayor Defends Ban on Church Services in Schools, N.Y. TIMES BLOG, Feb. 13, 2012, 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/bloomberg-defends-schools-ouster-of-worship-
services/ (reporting on New York City‘s decision to ban churches from holding services in public 
schools). 
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Court‘s Citizens United ruling,6 we do know that Americans tend to reject 
the notion that the corporate person possesses rights on par with the 
natural person.
7
 And while citizens are more inclined to defend the 
autonomy of religious groups, it is not clear whether that inclination is just 
a relatively weak extension of our traditionally strong commitment to 
individual religious liberty, or whether there is meaningful recognition of 
the importance of group liberty. Especially outside the context of religious 
organizations, the deference owed to groups by the surrounding political 
community remains unsettled.  
Today‘s most contentious debates about legal protection for group 
autonomy have focused on the group‘s freedom to defy the political 
community‘s judgment as to what the common good entails, whether that 
judgment is expressed as broadly applicable nondiscrimination laws, 
limitations on the right to decline to provide certain morally contested 
goods or services, or conditions attached to government funding. When a 
group claims a right of moral autonomy, the claims encounter rougher 
political terrain than similar claims made by individuals. Because we 
cannot easily place the group‘s asserted right of moral autonomy within 
the prevailing individual-versus-state paradigm for analyzing claims of 
conscience, we tend to view groups as interlopers masquerading as 
individuals. Groups do not have consciences; individuals do, and we 
struggle to understand a group claim for moral autonomy as anything other 
than an artificial claim of conscience. The pantheon of conscience‘s heroes 
includes Thoreau, Gandhi, and King, not the Boy Scouts, Walgreen‘s, or 
Catholic Charities. Invoking a right of group conscience has enjoyed 
limited traction in our political discourse. Indeed, we often believe that the 
best way to honor individuals‘ consciences is by empowering them to 
overcome obstacles presented by groups. 
Contrast our legal tradition‘s lionization of Daniel Seeger, who 
objected on moral grounds to military service,
8
 with the cursory dismissal 
of the claims raised by Elane Photography, a husband-and-wife photo 
agency in New Mexico that declined on moral grounds to shoot a same-
sex commitment ceremony. The agency was fined nearly $7000 for 
 
 
 6. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. 
 7. See, e.g., Two years after Citizens United, voters fed up with money in politics, PUBLIC 
CAMPAIGN ACTION FUND (Jan. 19, 2012), http://campaignmoney.org/files/DemCorpPCAFmemo 
FINAL.pdf (reporting that 62 percent of Americans oppose the Citizens United decision).  
 8. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (―In light of his beliefs and the 
unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose 
today, would have granted him the exemption [from military service].‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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violating the state‘s anti-discrimination law.9 Part of the difference, no 
doubt, is the commercial nature of the enterprise, and I will address that 
aspect below. But part of the difference is the belief that, as long as the 
husband and wife who comprise the photo agency are not coerced as 
individuals into engaging in conduct that they believe is immoral, it does 
not matter if the corporate form that they have chosen is implicated in the 
objectionable conduct. As one noted civil rights scholar (and current 
member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) remarked, 
―if you run a wedding photography service, even if you don‘t like the fact 
that those two gays are getting married, you‘d better have someone on 
your staff who will take those pictures.‖10 
As I argue in a recent book,
11
 I believe that such responses derive from 
a superficial understanding of conscience. I need to explain why in order 
to provide a broader context for my reaction to Professor John Inazu‘s 
effort to reclaim the right of assembly.
12
 Suggesting that the owners of 
Elane Photography can honor their consciences by keeping their moral 
beliefs out of the marketplace ignores the external orientation of 
conscience: conscientia refers to moral belief applied to conduct. 
Respecting conscience as an internalized set of beliefs does not 
authentically respect conscience. Similarly short-sighted is the idea that 
the owners can avoid the problem by hiring an employee who is willing to 
shoot events that they themselves deem morally objectionable. This solves 
nothing unless we only see conscience in individualist terms, as though its 
claims apply to its bearer‘s own conduct and no further. In reality, 
conscience refers (literally) to shared moral belief, and while not every 
claim of conscience will actually be shared, such claims are, by their 
nature, susceptible to sharing. As such, the owners‘ refusal to make hires 
that would permit them to offer a ―full service‖ photography agency is not 
an imperialist expansion of conscience‘s interior domain; it is a natural 
outgrowth of conscience‘s relational dimension. Institutions do not possess 
a conscience in any real sense, but they do embody distinct moral 
identities that are shaped by their constituents‘ consciences. When we 
preclude the cultivation and maintenance of such institutional identities, it 
is not just moral pluralism that suffers; it is the cause of conscience itself. 
 
 
 9. Willock v. Elane Photography, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Human Rights Comm‘n Apr. 
9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf.  
 10. Gay Rights Law Faces Legal, Religious Challenges, NPR TALK OF THE NATION (June 16, 
2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91554986 (comments of Chai Feldblum). 
 11. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010). 
 12. JOHN INAZU, LIBERTY‘S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2011).  
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I believe that we need to recapture the relational dimension of 
conscience—i.e., the notion that the dictates of conscience are defined, 
articulated, and lived out in relationship with others. My moral convictions 
have sources beyond myself, and my sense of self comes into relief 
through interaction with others. When I live according to the dictates of 
my conscience, I communicate the normative implications that flow from 
my perception of reality; my conscience makes truth claims that possess 
authority over conduct—my own and the conduct of those who share, or 
come to share, my perception. Conscience connects a person to something 
bigger than herself, not only because we form our moral convictions 
through interaction with the world around us, but also because we invest 
those convictions with real-world authority in ways that are accessible to 
others. This is the relational dimension of conscience. 
As such, if our society‘s commitment to conscience is grounded solely 
in the language and legal framework of individual rights, we are not fully 
committed to conscience. Conscience‘s substance and real-world 
implications are relational by their very nature. Though conscience is 
intensely personal, the nature of conscience directs our gaze outward, to 
sources of formation, to communities of discernment, and to venues for 
expression. When the state closes avenues by which persons live out their 
core beliefs—and admittedly, some avenues must be closed in the interest 
of peaceful co-existence—there is a cost to the continued vitality of 
conscience.  
There are many examples we could use to explore this dynamic, but 
let‘s use one that everyone has been talking about lately: the Obama 
administration‘s mandate on contraception coverage. Pursuant to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
13
 the Department of Health 
and Human Services (―HHS‖) announced that it would require all 
employers offering health insurance to cover certain types of preventive 
care at no additional cost to their employees. Contraceptives and 
sterilizations are part of the mandate, including products considered by 
some to be abortifacents. The mandate exempted ―religious employers,‖ 
which were defined as an employer who: 
(1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; 
(2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; 
 
 
 13. Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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(3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is 
a non-profit organization [as defined elsewhere].
14
  
As widely commented, the ministry of Jesus himself would have not 
qualified as ―religious‖ under this definition.  
What I am interested in for purposes of this discussion is how 
defenders of the mandate have framed the conscience issue. The Obama 
administration‘s press secretary noted that ―this approach does not signal 
any change at all in the administration‘s policy on conscience 
protections.‖15 The implementing regulations addressed the conscience 
objection head-on, explaining that: 
Nothing in these final regulations precludes employers or others 
from expressing their opposition, if any, to the use of 
contraceptives, requires anyone to use contraceptives, or requires 
health care providers to prescribe contraceptives if doing so is 
against their religious beliefs. These final regulations do not 
undermine the important protections that exist under conscience 
clauses and other religious exemptions in other areas of Federal law. 
Conscience protections will continue to be respected and strongly 
enforced.
16
 
Kathleen Sebelius, the HHS Secretary, used similar reasoning in defending 
the mandate, emphasizing that the new rule does not preclude ―a Catholic 
doctor, for example, [from refusing] to write a prescription for 
contraception,‖ nor ―does it affect an individual woman's freedom to 
decide not to use birth control.‖17 The liberty of conscience is satisfied, 
under these terms, as long as the employer can tell its employees that the 
use of contraceptives is immoral, and as long as no individual is forced to 
use contraceptives or prescribe them. In my view, this marginalizes both 
the action-oriented pull of conscience, as well as its relational dimension.  
The Obama administration did not go as far as some of the mandate‘s 
defenders, though, who insisted that overcoming the institutional obstacles 
to contraceptive coverage was necessary to vindicate the conscience rights 
of employees. Eric Bugyis, for example, described the mandate as ―a 
 
 
 14. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. Part 147. 
 15. Jay Carney, Press Briefing, Jan. 31, 2012. 
 16. See supra note 14. 
 17. ―It‘s important to note.‖ Kathleen Sebelius, Contraception rule respects religion, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 5, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-02-05/Kathleen-
Sebelius-contraception-exemption/52975092/1.  
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victory for all those who care about the religious liberty of individuals and 
the freedom of individual conscience, which by definition is meant to be 
protected from the unwelcome coercion by institutions to do things (or not 
do things) that are not relevant to the performance of one‘s explicit duties 
to them, including one‘s employer.‖18 In the same vein, Vyckie Garrison 
accused the religious employers of ―taking away women‘s freedom of 
conscience and giving it to the Church.‖19 The liberty of conscience, in 
these terms, is not just about protecting the individual from being coerced 
by the state to act in ways that she considers to be morally impermissible. 
The liberty of conscience empowers the individual to enlist third parties in 
supporting her choice to undertake actions that she deems morally 
permissible. Conscience as positive liberty for individual consumers 
precludes conscience as negative liberty for group providers.  
For the reasons set out earlier, I believe that these critics‘ 
characterizations of the conscience interests at stake, as well as the Obama 
administration‘s focus on the liberty of individual providers, overlook the 
relational dimension of conscience. We should work to avoid forcing an 
organization to choose between dropping health care coverage for its 
employees and directly facilitating its employees‘ use of a product that it 
deems immoral. My point, though, is not to argue the merits of the 
contraception mandate, but to briefly sketch the case for robust—but not 
unlimited—autonomy for groups to stake out their own moral identities 
and explore whether the current legal tools available to groups are 
sufficient to make that case. If they are, then Inazu‘s book is a well-written 
and interesting academic exercise. If the current tools are not sufficient, 
though, then Inazu‘s book may be the start of something big.  
The political debate about the HHS mandate is playing out right now. It 
is entirely possible that my argument about the relational dimension of 
conscience—i.e., that groups are essential venues through which 
individuals form, express, and live out the dictates of conscience—will fail 
to find traction politically. My argument might fail either as a general 
proposition or in a particular context, such as the HHS mandate, where 
state interests may be judged by the public to be more compelling than the 
employers‘ interests. If voters take a pass on my invitation to maintain 
 
 
 18. Eric Bugyis, Obama Defends Conscience, COMMONWEAL BLOG (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www 
.commonwealmagazine.org/blog/?p=16864.  
 19. Vyckie Garrison, Why the Birth Control Mandate is Not About “Freedom of Conscience,” 
RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/02/13/why-birth-con 
trol-compromise-is-not-about-%E2%80%9Cfreedom-conscience%E2%80%9D (emphasis omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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space for religious institutions to decline to cover contraceptives, does the 
Constitution provide backup protection? 
One potential source of protection is the right of association under the 
First Amendment. As Inazu so ably explains in his book, the right of 
association does not help unless the group is found by the courts to qualify 
as an intimate or expressive association. In Roberts v. Jaycees, the Court 
explained that special protection for intimate associations is warranted 
because these ―personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and 
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and 
beliefs . . . thereby foster[ing] diversity and act[ing] as critical buffers 
between the individual and the power of the State.‖20 Further, protecting 
these relationships from which ―individuals draw much of their emotional 
enrichment from close ties with others‖ will thereby safeguard the ability 
―to define one‘s identity.‖21 
In the hypothetical Roberts dissent that he includes in his book, Inazu 
points out that the distinction ―between intimate and nonintimate 
associations is unconvincing‖ because ―all of the values, benefits, and 
attributes that the majority assigns to intimate associations are equally 
applicable to many if not most nonintimate associations.‖22 Nevertheless, 
courts are not going to find that Catholic Charities, St. Luke‘s Hospital, 
Ave Maria University, or the other employers objecting to the mandate 
qualify as intimate associations. 
Gaining status as an expressive association might also prove difficult, 
though of course all of the associations I just mentioned are expressive as 
that term is commonly understood. Inazu correctly notes that 
―communicative possibility exists in joining, excluding, gathering, 
proclaiming, engaging, or not engaging,‖ and that ―[o]nce a relational 
association is stipulated between two or more people, any act by those 
people—when consciously undertaken as members of the association—
has expressive potential reflective of that association.‖23 Under the current 
interpretation of the right of association, though, even organizations that 
undeniably express messages to some constituents as part of their 
animating purpose—e.g., Catholic colleges or charitable organizations—
may be hard-pressed to persuade a court that messages to employees about 
contraceptive use fall within the scope of that expressive function. The 
district court in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez found that the student 
 
 
 20. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 21. Id. 
 22. INAZU, supra note 12, at 180. 
 23. Id. at 161. 
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group failed to submit ―any evidence demonstrating that teaching certain 
values to other students is part of the organization‘s mission or purpose, or 
that it seeks to do so by example, such that the mere presence of someone 
who does not fully comply with the prescribed code of conduct would 
force CLS to send a message contrary to its mission.‖24 Just as, in the 
Court‘s view, the presence of a non-complying member would not, ―by 
their presence alone . . . impair CLS‘s ability to convey its beliefs,‖ courts 
would likely find that complying with a legal requirement to cover 
contraceptives would not impair the Catholic college‘s, hospital‘s, or 
charity‘s ability to convey their beliefs.  
The Free Exercise Clause may be similarly unavailing in light of 
Employment Division v. Smith, which upheld neutral laws of general 
applicability even if these laws burden religious exercise. The 
implementing regulations for the HHS mandate clearly were written with 
Smith in mind, as they explained that ―[t]he contraceptive coverage 
requirement is generally applicable and designed to serve the compelling 
public health and gender equity goals described above, and is in no way 
specially targeted at religion or religious practices.‖25 Though the Supreme 
Court‘s recent 9–0 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor brought new attention to the 
Free Exercise Clause, the ministerial exemption affirmed by that case 
applies only to employment decisions in the (still murky) category of 
―ministers.‖ Outside that context, the Free Exercise Clause has been 
famously ―eviscerated‖ by Smith.26 The number of exceptions permitted 
 
 
 24. Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *22 (N.D. Cal. 
May 19, 2006).  
 25. The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (―RFRA‖) may offer a viable cause of action 
in this context, though there is a split of opinion on that question. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 
et seq. In any event, my focus here is whether the Constitution provides a remedy in the event that 
political support for associational autonomy in this context proves unsustainable. 
 26. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 157 
(2004) (exploring what is left of the ―eviscerated Free Exercise Clause‖); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, 
Religious Freedom and the Rule of Law: Exporting Modernity in a Postmodern World?, 22 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 173 (2003) (―[T]he free exercise clause has simply been eviscerated . . . .‖). See also Rodney J. 
Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 407 (1994) (arguing that further application of the 
reasoning in recent Supreme Court cases would ―render the Free Exercise Clause virtually judicially 
dead‖ for minority religious practices); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (arguing that the neutrality principle incorrectly places ―the 
freedom of citizens to exercise their faith . . . [at the mercy of the] vagaries of democratic politics 
. . . .‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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under the mandate may open up a potential challenge consistent with 
Smith,
27
 but its prospects are far from certain. 
All of this goes to establishing the timeliness and importance of Inazu‘s 
book: does the right of assembly he prescribes offer the promise of 
protection for group autonomy that is currently lacking in constitutional 
interpretation? I think it does, at least under Inazu‘s understanding of the 
right as encompassing much more than a right of petition.
28
 He defines the 
right of assembly as:  
[A] presumptive right of individuals to form and participate in 
peaceable, noncommercial groups. This right is rebuttable when 
there is a compelling reason for thinking that the justifications for 
protecting assembly do not apply (as when the group prospers under 
monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions).
29
 
The scenarios through which Inazu works out the right of assembly tend to 
focus on the right to exclude, which is understandable given recent 
Supreme Court case law and the fact that the most pressing challenge to 
group autonomy is an expanding array of nondiscrimination laws. But 
given the values that Inazu locates as lying at the heart of the right of 
assembly, the right would also include a group‘s practices beyond 
questions of membership. On this front, Inazu‘s emphasis on the value of 
dissent is instructive. He sees ―pluralism and dissent‖ as being ―among our 
nation‘s deepest cultural commitments,‖ noting that ―[d]issenting practices 
confront an ever-present challenge by the state to domesticate their 
 
 
 27. As Tom Berg explains: 
[T]he small-employer exception to the HHS mandate [for example] is . . . primarily driven by 
a concern that small businesses experience a disproportionate imposition from the rule. And 
then the argument kicks in that religious freedom interests should receive similar 
consideration, because those organizations likewise experience a serious burden, unless 
there's a compelling interest in making the distinction. Although the government might 
respond that the reason for the small-employer exception is simply that each one does not 
undercut coverage as much as each large employer, we all know the obvious logic of 
aggregation across a category. Here, when you exempt all entities under 50 employees, you 
cut out 20-40 million employees . . . . For the government to accept that big a hole in the 
mandate but then to say religious organizations deserve very little accommodation may not 
target religious conscience, but there‘s a decent argument that it significantly devalues it. 
Thomas C. Berg, On Rob’s Questions About the HHS Mandate and Smith, MIRROR OF JUSTICE BLOG 
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/04/on-robs-questions-about-the-
hhs-mandate-and-smith.html. 
 28. INAZU, supra note 12, at 6 (―[T]he text of the First Amendment and the corresponding 
debates over the Bill of Rights suggest that the framers understood assembly to encompass more than 
petition.‖). 
 29. Id. at 14. 
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destabilizing tendencies.‖30 Dissent is not an uncontested American value, 
though, as ―[p]owerful countervailing visions of stability and consensus 
from mid-twentieth-century pluralism and Rawlsian liberalism have 
sought to bind our country together at the cost of silencing the margins of 
dissent.‖31 While not every group dissents, Inazu contends that ―the groups 
that shape the boundaries of autonomy are those that reject consensus 
norms.‖32 
It is the protection of a group‘s dissent function that makes the right of 
assembly so potentially valuable, and such an obvious fit for religious 
groups that dissent from the government‘s view of contraception as a core 
element of health care. By championing a group‘s right to live out its 
values, even if the group does not set out with the explicit purpose of 
transmitting those values, Inazu‘s retrieval of the right of assembly 
provides a new dimension to our ongoing struggle over the role of groups 
in our legal framework. He has not purported to provide the final and 
conclusive word on the right of assembly‘s potential contribution or 
operation, but he has initiated an important and overdue conversation. In 
keeping with that theme, let me continue the conversation by asking three 
questions that were prompted by his analysis. 
First, why is the right of assembly limited to noncommercial groups? 
Even in the debate over the HHS contraception mandate, critics have 
wondered why for-profit employers or insurers are presumed to fall 
outside the scope of any prudent exemption. In the context of political 
speech, courts have refused to draw lines between non-profit and for-profit 
organizations. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that ―political 
speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its 
source is a corporation.‖33 The Court‘s resistance to excluding 
corporations from free speech protection is functional: the reasons we 
value free speech apply to individuals, non-profit groups, and for-profit 
corporations. As the Court recognized twenty-five years before Citizens 
United, ―Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute 
to the ‗discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas 
that the First Amendment seeks to foster.‘‖34  
 
 
 30. Id. at 156. 
 31. Id. at 152. 
 32. Id. at 156. 
 33. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm‘n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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By the same token, why is it not the case that ―corporations and other 
associations, like individuals,‖ contribute to values that the right of 
assembly seeks to foster? We need to do more than draw distinctions in 
form, for the Court has prohibited the government from banning ―political 
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken the 
corporate form.‖35 While a formal distinction is easy, a functional 
distinction is more elusive. Whatever value the assemblies of the ACLU, 
Habitat for Humanity, and the PTA contribute by their very existence, a 
for-profit corporation that defies prevailing moral wisdom or stakes out a 
religiously inspired dissenting position contributes the same kind of value. 
Some of the most contentious battles between the government and groups 
attempting to cultivate distinct moral identities have involved for-profit 
corporations, ranging from Wal-Mart,
36
 to law firms,
37
 to dating services,
38
 
to pharmacies.
39
 
Commercial speech has traditionally been afforded less protection than 
noncommercial speech, but there is some doubt whether lesser protection 
for commercial speech makes sense,
40
 and the rationales usually offered do 
not necessarily apply to assembly. Charles Fischette, for example, argues 
that commercial speech ―is generally less susceptible to chilling effects 
because of the economic motivations supporting it.‖41 Similarly, C. Edwin 
Baker asserts that: 
Ideally, the content, the form, and particularly the intensity and 
direction of the propagation of commercial speech is determined by 
 
 
 35. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
 36. See Peter Lattman, Wal-Mart Sued Over Not Stocking Morning-After Pill, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/02/02/wal-mart-sued-over-not-stocking-morning-
after-pill/.  
 37. See Editorial, Unveiled Threats, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007 (responding to Defense 
Department official who gave interview in which he suggested that clients should boycott law firms 
that defended Guantanamo Bay detainees). 
 38. See Beth DeFalco, eHarmony agrees to provide same-sex matches, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 20, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27821393/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/ 
eharmony-agrees-provide-same-sex-matches/ (―Online dating service eHarmony said Wednesday it 
will launch a new Web site which caters to same-sex singles as part of a discrimination settlement with 
New Jersey‘s Civil Rights Division.‖). 
 39. See Gretchen Ruethling, Illinois Pharmacist Sues Over Contraceptive Rule, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2005 (―A pharmacist in Illinois has filed a lawsuit challenging an order by Gov. Rod R. 
Blagojevich requiring pharmacies to dispense birth control and emergency contraceptives without 
delay.‖). 
 40. ―The commercial speech exception has continually eluded theoretical justification . . . .‖ C. 
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 
(1976).  
 41. Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 663, 667 (2008). 
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calculating its positive contribution to profits. A standard given and 
enforced by the structure of the competitive market rather than the 
speaker‘s value choice or prejudice lies at the source of commercial 
speech.
42
 
As such, ―[t]he domination of profit, a structurally required standard, 
breaks the connection between speech and any vision, or attitude, or value 
of the individual or group engaged in advocacy,‖ and thus ―the content and 
form of commercial speech cannot be attributed to individual value 
allegiances.‖43 
This just does not do justice to the reality of the corporate landscape.
44
 
Whether it‘s a for-profit company taking a stand on animal testing, climate 
change, same-sex partner benefits, refusals to stock the morning after pill, 
or countless other morally contested issues, there is regularly a connection 
between corporate practices and an underlying vision, attitude, or value. 
Further, the ―domination of profit‖ is not a ―structurally required 
standard.‖ We tend to define the corporation‘s sole purpose as profit 
maximization, but that may reflect an overly narrow understanding of 
shareholders‘ interests. In terms of fostering loyalty among shareholders, 
customers, and employees, prudent managers may be led to make non-
profit-maximizing decisions that support the corporation‘s moral identity. 
Lyman Johnson, critiquing the law-and-economics movement, observes 
that ―[t]he dignity, inherent worth, and enormous energy and initiative of 
the individual are rightly valued, but to conceive of human existence 
solely as a vast collection of individuals is to fail to explain many of our 
existing social arrangements and interactions and to provide no solid 
moral foundation for genuinely selfless behavior.‖45 Profit maximization is 
not a legal requirement for corporations, publicly traded or not.
46
 
 
 
 42. See Baker, supra note 40, at 14.  
 43. Id. at 17. 
 44. See Robert K. Vischer, The Morally Distinct Corporation: Reclaiming the Relational 
Dimension of Conscience, 5 J. OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 323 (2008), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028881. 
 45. Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2248 (1992). 
 46. Even scholars who take a ―contractarian‖ approach to the corporation leave room for 
objectives beyond profit maximization: 
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field 
of interesting questions one that has plagued many writers: what is the goal of the 
corporation? Is it profit (and for whom)? Social welfare more broadly defined? . . . Our 
response to such questions is: ‗Who cares?‘ If the New York Times is formed to publish a 
newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be allowed to object. Those who 
came in at the beginning actually consented, and those who came in later bought stock at a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/6
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Enron famously pursued profit to the exclusion of longer-range 
interests. But not every company is Enron. Interstate Batteries‘ mission 
statement is ―[t]o glorify God as we supply our customers worldwide with 
top quality, value-priced batteries, related electrical power-source 
products, and distribution services.‖47 The fast food chain Chick-fil-A 
sacrifices potential profit by closing all of its stores on Sundays.
48
 At 
ServiceMaster, a statue of Jesus washing his disciples‘ feet stands outside 
the company headquarters, and no one earns more than twelve times the 
amount earned by the lowest-paid employee.
49
 After a fire burned down its 
mill, the Malden Mills CEO cited his Jewish faith as the reason for 
keeping his employees on the payroll and under the company‘s benefits 
coverage even though they had no work to do.
50
 
If a for-profit corporation dissents from the moral norms embodied in a 
particular law, and we are confident that the dissent is not solely related to 
the avoidance of an economic burden, why should we not want to protect 
its right of assembly? In Roberts, Justice O‘Connor‘s concurring opinion 
highlighted the fact that the Jaycees promote commercial opportunities to 
its members, reasoning that groups that are engaged primarily in 
commercial activities warrant less protection from government intrusion 
than groups engaged primarily in activities covered by the First 
Amendment.
51
 Inazu recognizes that this ―posits a false dichotomy 
between commercial and express[ive] associations,‖ as ―some commercial 
associations are expressive.‖52  
So why introduce the distinction into the right of assembly? Inazu 
might want to maintain a commercial / noncommercial distinction in order 
to make the right of assembly more palatable as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation. Giving Wal-Mart a constitutional right to ignore legal 
mandates—though that right would not enjoy blanket immunity from 
 
 
price reflecting the corporation‘s tempered commitment to a profit objective. . . . Corporate 
ventures may select their preferred ‗constituencies.‘ 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1446 
(1989).  
 47. See Victor Godinez, Some Corporate Execs Follow Spiritual Beliefs, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Dec. 25, 2001.  
 48. See Faith in the Workplace, RELIGION & ETHICS NEWSWEEKLY (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www 
.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week822/cover.html. 
 49. See Marc Gunther, God & Business, FORTUNE (July 9, 2001), http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/07/09/306536/index.htm. 
 50. See Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 149 (1996). 
 51. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 639 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―The State of Minnesota has a 
legitimate interest in ensuring nondiscriminatory access to the commercial opportunity presented by 
membership in the Jaycees.‖). 
 52. INAZU, supra note 12, at 135. 
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countervailing state interests, I assume—may understandably be a bridge 
too far.  
The political sensitivities raised by the potential expansiveness of the 
right of assembly leads to a second question: are Inazu‘s concerns best 
addressed through the Constitution, or are his questions more properly 
addressed to political actors? More precisely, does the nature of the 
inquiry contemplated by Inazu fit more comfortably within the contours of 
a political resolution than a judicial one? Under his framework, courts 
need to inquire into a group‘s ―peaceability‖ and commercial nature, 
among other criteria. My hesitation does not stem from the fact that Inazu 
proposes a highly fact-intensive determination of whether the right of 
assembly should overcome the opposing state interests—after all, courts 
are often better at fact-finding than legislatures are. It is the nature of the 
facts that lie at the heart of the inquiry. Inazu explains:  
In my view, we are better off with a contextual analysis that allows 
courts to examine how power operates on the ground. This approach 
would ask courts to evaluate challenges to the exercise of the right 
of assembly in the specific contexts in which those assemblies 
exist.
53
 
Pursuant to this standard, Inazu suggests that the state is justified in 
overcoming the right of assembly when a group has a monopoly or near-
monopoly. That makes sense based on my assumption that Inazu is 
concerned with maintaining access to goods or services deemed essential 
by the political community. The state‘s intervention should be triggered by 
demonstrable access problems, not simply by abstract notions of customer 
rights. Let me suggest, though, that ensuring access may be facilitated 
more effectively by the state‘s professional licensing function, rather than 
by case-by-case adjudication of a constitutional right. In the pharmacy 
context, for example, the state could be legislatively empowered to declare 
a market failure with respect to particular pharmaceutical products and to 
require the provision of those pharmaceuticals as a condition of licensing 
in a given geographic area.  
To the extent that Inazu is limiting the right of assembly to 
noncommercial enterprises, it is not entirely clear why monopolistic status 
is important to the inquiry unless he has in mind charitable organizations 
that may be the only provider of key social services in a given community. 
Even in that context, though, the state needs to proceed carefully, as the 
 
 
 53. Id. at 15. 
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alternative to a provider who refuses to provide all the services deemed 
important by the state may be no provider at all.  
It is easier to make such context-driven judgments legislatively than 
judicially, but perhaps, in light of the important values served by the 
continued viability of even unpopular groups, we need a constitutional 
right of assembly to keep a proverbial thumb on the scale. Underlying 
Inazu‘s exhaustive research and careful tracing of the right of assembly‘s 
demise is a heartfelt concern for the ability of groups to flourish in a legal 
and political culture that often appears inescapably oriented toward 
individualism. Americans are quick to resist state encroachments on an 
individual‘s right to ―define one‘s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,‖54 and non-state 
associations may get painted with the same broad brush as obstacles to the 
full realization of an individual‘s autonomy. Unless a particular group 
serves a function deemed worthy by the political community, the group 
may be increasingly hard-pressed to resist state encroachments on its own 
autonomy.  
My tendency to favor political resolutions in debates involving groups 
may be overlooking the reason why the right of assembly was included in 
the First Amendment‘s text—groups are unlikely to get a fair shake 
politically in situations where we need them most. In this regard, the right 
of assembly provides a degree of countermajoritarian protection for 
dissent in a way that the artificially narrow expressive and intimate rights 
of association do not. 
This leads to my third and final question. Inazu makes a powerful case 
that the right of association, as presently construed by courts, is inadequate 
to the task. But is it beyond reclamation? If interpreted differently, would 
the right of association prove capable of carrying the burden that Inazu 
lays on the right of assembly? 
My instinct tells me that Inazu is right, that we actually need to look 
beyond the right of association for more robust protection of associational 
rights. The right of assembly is a potentially more powerful resource, if for 
no other reason than the fact that it is found in the text of the Constitution. 
(Witness the ongoing battles over the right to privacy.) Further, the right 
of association has origins in natural law reasoning that have grown 
increasingly contested. Seen in this light, it may not be that courts have 
shifted on the right of association, but that the epistemological foundations 
 
 
 54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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on which the right of association was originally based have shifted on the 
courts.  
Consider the important precursors to the right of intimate association. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska,
55
 the Court struck down a state law banning the 
teaching of foreign languages to students before they graduated from 
eighth grade, reasoning that there was insufficient justification for state 
interference ―with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and 
with the power of parents to control the education of their own.‖56 In 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
57
 the Court held that the state could not require 
parents to send their children to public schools, for ―[t]he fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.‖58 
Taken together, these cases establish the right of parents to direct the 
education of their children. For our current purposes, the more salient 
point is that the decisions are premised on the recognition that the parent-
child association is not a creation of the law, and that the parental care-
giving authority on which the relationship rests does not represent a 
delegation of state authority. These are natural law cases. The Supreme 
Court deferred to a pre-legal sovereignty within the family that stems from 
the natural fact of care-giving relationships and the associational 
autonomy on which their function depends.  
Today criticism of these cases abounds, and the holdings have been 
narrowly construed, even on issues within the education arena.
59
 Meyer 
and Pierce are accused by Barbara Woodhouse of being animated by ―a 
conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-stratified 
society, and to a parent‘s private property rights in his children and their 
labor,‖ reflecting a ―narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as 
essentially private property.‖60 And Meyer in particular is seen as having 
―announced a dangerous form of liberty, the right to control another 
human being.‖61 The legal recognition of parental authority in such cases 
 
 
 55. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 56. Id. at 401. 
 57. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 58. Id. at 535. 
 59. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (―[W]e affirm 
that the Meyer-Pierce due process rights of parents to make decisions regarding their children‘s 
education does not entitle parents to enjoin school boards from providing information the boards 
determine to be appropriate in connection with the performance of their educational functions . . . .‖). 
 60. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992).  
 61. Id. at 1001.  
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generally underscores the ―bias towards adults‘ possessive individualism,‖ 
which ―objectifies children and places physical control and possession of 
the children, rather than demonstrated service or shared concern for their 
well-being, at the center of controversy.‖62 
In another landmark right of association case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 
the Court struck down a state ban on the use of contraceptives.
63
 Because 
the prohibition applied to married couples, the Court ruled that it violated 
a ―right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political 
parties, older than our school system.‖64 Marriage, the Court observed, is: 
[A] coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.
65
 
The ancient lineage of marital associations kept its constitutional relevance 
for only a few years. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a 
Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives even though the 
statute exempted married couples. The court reasoned that, while the right 
of privacy in Griswold ―inhered in the marital relationship,‖ the married 
couple ―is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but 
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup.‖ As such, ―[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.‖66 Over 
the intervening decades, courts have become even less inclined to defer to 
marriage as an ontological reality that lies beyond the law‘s reach.67 
 
 
 62. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ 
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1811 (1993). 
 63. Griswold also identified Meyer and Pierce as being based on the right of association. See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
 64. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. 
 65. Id. at 486. 
 66. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (citations omitted). See also INAZU, supra note 12, 
at 128 (quoting Jeff Powell) (In Eisenstadt, ―Brennan‘s reading of Griswold turned Douglas‘s 
reasoning on its head‖ and signaled ―the identification of a radically individualistic liberalism as the 
moral content of American constitutionalism.‖). 
 67. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (―Simply put, the 
government creates civil marriage . . . . [T]here are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing 
spouses and an approving State.‖). 
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These developments within the jurisprudence of intimate associations 
do not call into question the relatively unbroken line of cases upholding 
the right of association for groups that are more obviously expressive,
68
 
though if the group has not staked its expressive identity on the point 
under dispute, even that dimension of the right seems less than secure.
69
 
More broadly though, if the right of association has limited power to 
protect the autonomy of natural relationships such as the one between 
parent and child, or longstanding social institutions such as marriage, it 
takes little imagination to see that the autonomy of other social groups 
may be even more precarious. If we are less prepared to give normative 
weight to the ―natural‖ existence of given social relationships, we may be 
more inclined to condition the relationship‘s legitimacy on its reflection of 
certain democratic attributes or civic virtues.  
Though Inazu does not trace the right of association‘s vulnerability 
back to a loss of confidence in any natural moral order, he is keenly aware 
of the conditional nature of the state‘s tolerance of groups. He explains: 
The thin protections of the right of association are underwritten by a 
political theory of consensus liberalism, which purports to be 
‗procedural‘ or ‗neutral‘ but whose espoused tolerance extends only 
to groups that endorse the fundamental assumptions of liberal 
democratic theory.
70
 
Nancy Rosenblum famously calls this the ―logic of congruence,‖71 and the 
idea is captured insightfully by Inazu‘s observation that ―assemblies as 
forms of expression were supplanted by associations as means of 
expression.‖72  
As we grow more suspicious that ―natural‖ rights can be used to mask 
injustices inherent in the status quo, we are less likely to grant blanket 
privileges to any particular category of relationships. The freedom 
becomes conditioned on the cultivation of certain democratic attributes or 
 
 
 68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 69. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 697 (finding it ―farfetched to assert that Dale‘s open declaration 
of his homosexuality, reported in a local newspaper, will effectively force [the Boy Scouts] to send a 
message to anyone simply because it allows Dale to be an Assistant Scoutmaster.‖) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting on behalf of himself and three other Justices). 
 70. INAZU, supra note 12, at 11. 
 71. The ―logic of congruence‖ requires ―that not only political institutions and public 
accommodations but also voluntary social groups function as mini-liberal democracies, with a view 
toward cultivating and sustaining self-respect.‖ This requires ―that the internal life and organization of 
associations mirror liberal democratic principles and practices.‖ NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP 
AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 36 (1998). 
 72. INAZU, supra note 12, at 65. 
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civic virtues within or through the relationship. Laura Rosenbury, for 
example, concedes the legitimacy of parental authority within the home, 
but sees a greater state role in ensuring that children are exposed to a 
variety of influences outside the home. Rather than viewing the formative 
social spaces between home and school as additional venues through 
which parents can raise their children consistently with the parents‘ 
priorities and values, she sees horizon-expanding functions in the Boy 
Scouts, sports leagues, and other civic or religious activities. Rosenbury 
laments the fact that pluralism only exists between families. She explains: 
Our society is pluralistic because many types of families are 
permitted to exist largely free from state indoctrination. In contrast, 
pluralism rarely exists within families. Children are generally 
exposed to just one belief system within the family, or at most two. 
Therefore, although children may not be standardized by the state, 
they often are standardized within their own families. Pluralism 
may exist on a broad, societal level, but children rarely experience 
pluralism on a micro level, within their own families.
73
  
We should be hesitant to ―cede childrearing between home and school to 
the control of parents and their surrogates,‖ she contends, because we 
stand to lose ―[i]mportant opportunities to expose children to the diversity 
of the broader society.‖74 The law has a role to play in mitigating the 
family‘s impact on the child by ensuring that she is exposed to diverse 
moral influences. My point is not that Rosenbury is wrong; my point is 
that her analysis reflects a broader hesitation to extrapolate constitutional 
―oughts‖ from the ―is‖ of natural relationships that are central to the 
human experience. In fact, on a range of issues beyond physical abuse and 
neglect, we may be more willing to use state authority to bring the ―is‖ 
closer to a state-defined ―ought.‖ If parents do not agree with the political 
community‘s judgment that a commitment to individual autonomy means 
that a child should be able to achieve a critical distance from the parents‘ 
worldview, the political community may owe less deference to the 
family‘s choices. The liberty of association is by no means eradicated in 
these contexts, but we may be more willing to attach strings to its exercise. 
We can see a similar dynamic operating in a variety of today‘s debates 
involving non-family groups, including the battle over the HHS 
contraception mandate. Consider a statistic cited repeatedly by the 
 
 
 73. Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 893 (2007) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 74. Id. at 894–95. 
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mandate‘s defenders that ―98 percent of Catholic women . . . have used 
contraception.‖75 Putting aside the questionable accuracy of the 
statement,
76
 how should this statistic play into our debate about the 
mandate? If the vast majority of a group‘s members defy the group‘s 
teaching on a particular issue—but have nevertheless chosen to remain 
members—does the political community owe less deference to the group 
on that issue? If the answer is yes, then the political community is 
projecting some significant democratic assumptions onto the group. The 
Catholic Church is no longer an alternative form of expression; it is a 
means of expressing its members‘ views in the same democratic form as 
other associations worthy of autonomy. In part because some of the 
bedrock right of association cases are grounded in natural order arguments 
that are increasingly contested, a textual anchor may be needed. Inazu has 
provided just that, and I look forward to seeing how the conversation 
unfolds over the months and years to come. 
 
 
 75. Cecilia Munoz, Director of White House Domestic Policy Council, Health Reform, 
Preventive Services, and Religious Institutions, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions 
(―According to a study by the Guttmacher Institute, most women, including 98 percent of Catholic 
women, have used contraception.‖). 
 76. See Glenn Kessler, The claim that 98 percent of Catholic women use contraception: a media 
foul, WASH. POST BLOG (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/the-
claim-that-98-percent-of-catholic-women-use-contraception-a-media-foul/2012/02/16/gIQAkPeqIR_ 
blog.html.  
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